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173 
EXILE AND ELECTION: THE CASE FOR 
BARRING EXILED LEADERS FROM 
CONTESTING IN NATIONAL ELECTIONS  
INTRODUCTION 
During the twentieth century, the world witnessed a series of regime 
changes. Dictatorships, military coups, and fascist governments were 
rejected in favor of democratic values and principles.
1
 This change in 
governance seems to have continued into the twenty-first century, albeit 
with some major challenges in the implementation of a democratic system 
in States.
2
 One of the more alarming trends has been exiled leaders 
returning to their State to contest national elections despite facing serious 
criminal charges. This causes the developing democratic State’s 
legitimacy of governance, free and fair elections, accountability, and 
transparency to be threatened. Fragile States struggling to implement 
democracy cannot do so without a stable elections system. The ability of 
exiled leaders to participate in elections when they have not been held 
accountable for serious offenses would greatly undermine the 
establishment of this system. To prevent this harm, international and 
domestic laws must begin to play a stronger role in addressing this 
problem. 
Pakistan is a State which highlights this troubling trend. In 2013, a 
Pakistani court indicted former President Pervez Musharraf (hereinafter 
Musharraf) for his alleged involvement in the 2007 assassination of former 
Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto (hereinafter Bhutto).
3
 The charges against 
Musharraf included murder and conspiracy to murder.
4
 Both political 
leaders shared a commonality: exile.
5
 Bhutto went into self-imposed
6
 exile 
 
 
 1. DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE: INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION FOR DEMOCRATIZATION 3 
(Peter Burnell ed.) (2000) (“The 1990s witnessed a dramatic increase in interest among western liberal 
democracies and international organizations in promoting democracy, human rights and good 
governance as the global gold standards for states.”). 
 2. For purposes of this Note, “State” means country. Matt Rosenberg, Country, State, and 
Nation, ABOUT.COM (June 10, 2015), http://geography.about.com/cs/politicalgeog/a/statenation.htm. 
(last visited Feb. 2, 2016). (“A country is a self-governing political entity. The term country can be 
used interchangeably with State.”). 
 3. Salman Masood and Declan Walsh, Pakistani Court Indicts Musharraf in 2007 Assassination 
of Bhutto, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2013), http://nyti.ms/19uSzoy. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Exile, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA (Oct. 11, 2013), http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/ 
p/index.php?title=Exile. (“Exile is a form of punishment in which one has to leave one’s home 
(whether that be on the level of city, region, or nation-state) while either being explicitly refused 
permission and/or being threatened by prison or death upon return. It is common to distinguish 
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in Britain and Dubai in 1999 following a number of corruption charges.
7
 
Musharraf left for London and Dubai in self-imposed exile in 2008
8
 after 
unlawfully suspending the country’s constitution and instituting 
emergency rule in 2007.
9
 Though Bhutto and Musharraf are not the first 
political leaders to exercise exile,
10
 their cases are distinct from most 
exiled leaders because despite pending criminal charges against them, both 
returned to Pakistan in order to contest the national election.  
Exiled leaders who have been charged with criminal offenses should be 
barred from standing in national elections until such charges are resolved 
through an adjudicative process relying on a combination of international 
and domestic laws. The policy rationale behind this proposition is two-
fold. First, it encourages the development of a stable democracy. Second, 
it serves as an incentive for current political leaders in developing 
countries to comply with domestic laws and international norms.  
This Note will explore the policies supporting a restriction on leaders, 
such as Musharraf and Bhutto, from participating in national elections 
until their criminal charges have been resolved. It will first present a brief 
historical gloss on exile and its formal use by world leaders. Next, in order 
to demonstrate the significance of utilizing both international and domestic 
laws, international electoral standards and Pakistan’s electoral standards 
will be assessed. In addition, the implications of this trend will be 
discussed by contrasting the exile of three highly controversial political 
leaders with cases in present-day Pakistan. Finally, the role of domestic 
and international laws, courts, and host States will be examined in relation 
to this proposition.   
 
 
between internal exile, forced resettlement within the country of residence, and external exile, 
deportation outside the country of residence.”) 
 6. Id. Self-imposed exile is usually viewed as a form of protest, or the individual’s avoidance of 
persecution or prosecution for criminal activity.  
 7. Benazir Bhutto: Women’s History, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/womens-
history/benazir-bhutto (last visited Oct. 2, 2015). 
 8. Pakistan’s Musharraf Charged in Treason Case, BBC NEWS (Mar. 31, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26815518. 
 9. Id. 
 10. See infra note 85. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss1/8
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Practice of Exile 
The concept of deposed leaders finding a safe haven dates back to 
ancient times.
11
 Peisistratus, a Greek tyrant, was overthrown “from office 
in Athens and exiled to northern Greece,”12 and “Scottish monarchs in the 
Middle Ages were often exiled to France . . . .”13 This exile may be 
voluntary or involuntary and may even be to a place within the country.
14
  
In the past, it was common practice for deposed leaders to flee to a 
country willing to take them, usually following a prior arrangement to end 
civil unrest.
15
 Professor David Anderson of the African Studies Centre at 
the University of Oxford claims that where a leader chooses to be exiled is 
often governed by personal relationships or past favors.
16
 For the host 
country it is a “benign gesture because these deposed leaders must no 
longer lead an active political life.”17 Promising a deposed leader a safe 
haven can bring peace after a civil war; this promise, however can later be 
rescinded.
18
 Professor Anderson believes that for deposed leaders 
“[t]here’s a sword of Damocles hanging over [them] . . . . If they break the 
terms of their guaranteed impunity, then they are in rough waters in terms 
of the politics around them and not allowed to stay.”19 There are of course 
risks for the host country as well. The host country could be seen as 
complicit in any crime(s) the deposed leader is accused of committing,
20
 
and the long arm of the law may permit allegations of corruption and 
abuse to end up in the host country.
21
  
The number of countries that may accept a deposed leader has been 
narrowed by the International Criminal Court (hereinafter ICC).
22
 
 
 
 11. Tom Geoghegan, What Happens to Deposed Leaders?, BBC NEWS MAGAZINE (Apr. 14, 
2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-13052996. 
 12. Id.  
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. The Arab Spring caused speculations as to the future of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi and 
Hosni Mubarak as fighting spread to Libya and Egypt.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. For example, former Liberian president Charles Taylor was taken in by Nigeria as they 
felt a regional responsibility, but he was later released when Sierra Leone requested his extradition. Id. 
He now faces 11 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Id  
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
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According to Patrick Smith, editor of the London-based newsletter Africa 
Confidential, “[t]he country shouldn’t be signatories to the International 
Criminal Court which leaves a lot of scope—China, America, Russia, and 
Israel—but also not be part of the international consensus . . . .”23 While 
the ICC has its share of critics,
24
 “there is general support for more 
mechanisms to bring tyrants to justice.”25 Given the increasing role of 
international law and its enforcement mechanics,
26
 it has become evident 
that a deposed leader has “no guarantee of impunity.”27 
Exile has been used especially by governments in power
28
 to prevent 
their political opponents from organizing in the country or becoming a 
martyr.
29
 Though exile typically represented a severe punishment,
30
 the 
rules of exile softened to some extent during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.
31
 Exiled individuals have been welcomed in other countries.
32
 
Exile has become more pleasant because modern-day exiled leaders often 
have accumulated wealth stored in other countries. As a result, they tend 
to live luxurious lives in exile.
33
  
 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Phil Clark, The Limits and Pitfalls of the International Criminal Court in Africa, E-
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.e-ir.info/2011/04/28/the-limits-and-pitfalls-
of-the-international-criminal-court-in-africa/. A significant criticism of the ICC is that it represents a 
neo-colonialist intervention in the affairs of African states by focusing solely on African conflicts to 
date. Id. In addition, because the ICC operates on a minimum budget, it has no police force of its own. 
Id. Instead it must rely on domestic states to investigate and prosecute their own cases. Id. This present 
challenges as well because it means the ICC may have to cooperate with state officials who themselves 
are suspected of committing atrocities. Id. In cases involving African states, some African 
governments have been willing to assist the ICC in exchange for protection of their officials from 
prosecution. Id. The ICC with its limited recourses of staff and finances cannot cover a global 
jurisdiction. Id.  
 25. Geoghegan, supra note 11. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Personal Exile, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/ 
Exile. (last visited Nov. 2, 2015). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. Poets Ovid and Du Fu were exiled to “strange or backward regions,” cut off from families 
and associates, as well as accustomed lifestyles. Id.  
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Leila Nadya Sadat, Exile, Amnesty and International Law, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 958 
(2006) (“Modern exile, however, is considerably more pleasant. Although banished from kin and 
country, today’s exiles often bring with them generous bank accounts and retire to live with a small 
retinue somewhere peaceful, and often quite attractive.”) Noting that Ferdinand Marcos found safe 
haven in Hawaii, Haiti’s “Baby Doc” Duvalier fled to south of France, Ethiopia’s Mengistu Haile 
Miriam went to Zimbabwe, and Uganda’s Idi Amin died peacefully in Saudi Arabia. Id. at 958-59. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss1/8
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Deposed leaders, usually corrupt during their rule, operate on the 
formula of diverting public funds for private gain.
34
 Transparency 
International has been pressuring both leaders of G20 countries and global 
financial institutions to freeze and investigate suspect assets.
35
 These 
investigations must be conducted quickly because the longer they take, the 
greater the chance the assets will be moved beyond investigators’ reach 
and the smaller the chance that public funds will be recovered. It is 
especially important for countries that accept assets from politically 
exposed individuals to identify illicit flow quickly and assist in the 
recovery of stolen assets, as required by the United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption (UNCAC), ratified by 148 countries.
36
  
B. International Electoral Standards 
International law contains a number of obligations
37
 relevant to 
democratic governance and elections. Included in these obligations are key 
principles of democratic elections, such as the right to be elected and the 
 
 
 34. Angela McClellan, Stolen Assets: Time to Act Now, TRANSPARENCY.ORG, http://archive. 
transparency.org/global_priorities/other_thematic_issues/global_crisis/stolen_assets_act (last visited 
Nov. 4, 2015). 
 35. Id. TI requested the G20 heads of states and the Emir of Dubai “to investigate any assets 
believed to be owned by former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak.” Id. It is estimated that “Egypt 
lost more than $6 billion per year to illicit financial activities and official government corruption.” Id. 
It is essential to recover assets illicitly transferred from the country because they could “provide much 
needed funds for development in the country where 40 per cent of the population lives on less than $2 
a day.” Id. Switzerland was the first to respond to this request by “freezing funds based on new 
legislation that allows them to confiscate assets for up to 10 years.” Id. This period “gives the country 
from where the assets are allegedly stolen time to initiate restitution requests.” Id. 
 36. Id. This is a big reason why TI lobbies for stronger and better international cooperation to 
prevent illicit flows and recover stolen assets. 
 37. Democracy Reporting International, Strengthening International Law to Support Democratic 
Governance and Genuine Elections, Report, CARTER CENTER 11 (2012), http://www.democracy 
reporting.org/files/dri_report_strengthening_democratic_governance_.pdf. “Obligations are defined as 
legally binding rules derived from international treaties, international customary law, general 
principles of law, or binding resolutions of international organizations.” Id. States are obliged to 
implement these obligations and in the case of a breach, they incur state responsibility. Id. The 
interpretation of obligations in a treaty is “guided by articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT 1969), which are generally considered to be international customary law.” Id. 
Article 31 (1) states that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.” Id. Additionally, “Article 31 (3) stipulates that subsequent state practice in the application of 
a treaty shall be taken into account when interpreting a treaty provision.” Id. at 11. See Guy S. 
Goodwin-Gill, Free and Fair Elections, IPU.ORG 159, http://www.ipu.org/PDF/publications/ 
Free&Fair06-e.pdf (“Putting the varied experience of international observer delegations, United 
Nations electoral assistance activities, and national laws and practices together with the existing rules 
and standards of international law allows for a reasonably coherent statement of the requirements for 
free and fair elections within today’s system of inter-dependent States.”). 
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right to an election that is “genuine.”38 Article 25 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter ICCPR) is “the 
cornerstone of democratic governance and genuine elections in 
international law.”39 Pakistan ratified and acceded to the ICCPR in June 
2010 thus becoming a State party to the convention.
40
 While international 
law sets minimum standards on key aspects of democratic governance, it 
does not establish a stand-alone “right to democracy” per se.41 These 
international standards are also sometimes vague and ambiguous.
42
 
Specifically, there remain ambiguities and gaps regarding implementation 
of electoral rights and obligations in the State because
43
 a fairly wide 
margin of discretion is left to the State in the implementation of electoral 
processes.
44
 More importantly:  
[o]bligations in international law are not generally self-executing—
they need implementation at the domestic level. The complexities 
and interrelationships between electoral rights and objectives seem 
clearly to require a statutory framework and appropriate machinery, 
but neither universal nor regional human rights instruments contain 
any formal obligation to enact electoral legislation.
45
  
The ICCPR, as well as regional treaties, include the right to vote and to be 
elected.
46
  
International law indicates what constitutes reasonable and 
unreasonable restrictions on the right to be elected; however, this right is 
only partially governed by international obligations.
47
 The United Nations 
Human Rights Commission (HRC)
48
 “argues that [a]ny restrictions on the 
 
 
 38. Democracy Reporting International, supra note 37, at 6.  
 39. Id.  
 40. Status of Ratification-International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, OHCHR.ORG 
(Feb. 10, 2016), http://indicators.ohchr.org/. 
 41. Democracy Reporting International, supra note 37, at 7.  
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 8. 
 44. Id. See also Goodwin-Gill, supra note 37, at 160 (“[t]he choices made by the State are thus to 
be applied so that they are effective, that is, oriented to the objective of a free and fair election; and in 
such a way as to take account of other obligations in the field of human rights.”).  
 45. Democracy Reporting International, supra note 37, at 174.  
 46. Id. at 52. 
 47. Id. at 47, 52.  
 48. Id. at 12 (“The HRC is the main body tasked with interpreting and monitoring compliance 
with the ICCPR. . . . [It] is composed of independent and renowned experts from all over the world.”). 
When issuing views on individual cases, “the HRC also issues General Comments that provide 
interpretation of articles of the ICCPR.” Id. However, “[n]either General Comments nor the views on 
individual cases are legally binding per se.” Id. HRC decisions nonetheless “carry the highest authority 
in interpreting ICCPR provisions.” Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss1/8
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right to stand for election . . . must be justifiable on objective and 
reasonable criteria.”49 Reasonable restrictions “include citizenship, 
reaching a minimum age for the office, mental incapacity established by a 
court, criminal conviction, conflicts of interest (for example, based on 
employment in the civil service), minimum amount of support from 
potential voters, or a reasonable monetary fee.”50 Article 25(b) of the 
ICCPR conditions that the rights contained therein should not be subject to 
unreasonable restrictions.
51
 The burden lies with the State to prove that 
any restriction imposed on an Article 25 right is objective and 
reasonable.
52
 In addition to electoral process rights, General Assembly 
resolution 59/201
53
 contains two other key elements of democratic 
governance, which are transparency and accountability.
54
  
Article 21(3) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR)
55
 states that “[t]he will of the people shall be the basis of the 
authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and 
genuine elections which shall be held by universal and equal suffrage and 
 
 
 49. Id. at 31. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 30. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 14. This resolution demonstrated “nearly global consensus on key elements of a 
democracy,” with 172 States in favor, 15 abstentions, and no rejections. Id. See also Goodwin-Gill, 
supra note 37, at 24 (“Over many years, the General Assembly’s resolutions on respect for the 
principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the electoral processes operated as 
counterweight to what many States perceived as an unjustifiable extension of UN activity into the 
reserved domain of domestic jurisdiction. . . . Many States nevertheless considered that a stronger 
defence of sovereignty and the reserved domain was required, together with the endorsement of a 
number of related principles of particular and lasting interest to the developing world.”). 
 54. Democracy Reporting International, supra note 37, at 12. General Assembly resolution 
59/201 states, “transparency in public administration is an essential element of democracy . . . . [T]here 
is generally consensus that it refers to unfettered access by the public to timely and reliable 
information on decisions and performance in the public sector.” Id. According to General Assembly 
resolution 59/201 (2005), accountability (the other essential element of democracy) “requires that the 
public, through the media, elections, parliaments, courts, or other independent institutions, is able to 
hold those in power responsible for their actions.” Accountability also “entails a high degree of 
transparency.” Id. at 13. 
 55. See Digital Record of the UDHR, OHCHR.ORG (Feb. 2009), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ 
NEWSEVENTS/Pages/DigitalrecordoftheUDHR.aspx (“The UDHR was proclaimed by the General 
Assembly on 10 December 1948, and since then is widely regarded as forming part of customary 
international law.”). See also Peter Bailey, The Creation of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, UNIVERSALRIGHTS.NET, http://www.universalrights.net/main/creation.htm (“[M]ost if not all 
the provisions of the UDHR have almost certainly become a part of international customary law. The 
view is steadily growing among international lawyers that practice (always an important source of 
international law) includes not only acts such as observing rules about navigation at sea but also acts 
such as voting for resolutions at United Nations and other international gatherings.”). See generally 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the Most Universal Document in the World, 
OHCHR.ORG, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Pages/WorldRecord.aspx (noting that the UDHR is 
the most translated documented with more than 300 languages and dialects to its credit).  
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shall be held by secret ballot or by equivalent free voting procedures.”56 
To comply with this edict, a State may consult with the International 
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (hereinafter International 
IDEA), an intergovernmental organization that supports sustainable 
democracy worldwide;
57
 it is the only global organization with this 
mandate.
58
 Its expertise includes “electoral processes, constitution 
building, political participation and representation, and democracy and 
development.”59 The organization has three aims: “increased capacity, 
legitimacy, and credibility of democracy; more inclusive participation and 
accountable representation; [and] more effective and legitimate democracy 
cooperation.”60 International IDEA has offices in Africa, Asia and the 
Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, West Asia, and North Africa 
regions; it is also a permanent observer to the United Nations.
61
 
C. Pakistan’s Electoral Standards 
Pakistan’s Constitution contains eligibility requirements for many 
States leadership positions. The Prime Minister (Chief Executive of the 
Republic) must be a citizen of Pakistan, a Muslim, a member of the 
National Assembly, be above 25 years of age if he or she is a member of 
the National Assembly or above 30 years of age if he or she is a member 
of the Senate.
62
 He or she must be able to provide a good conduct of 
character and is not commonly known as one who violates Islamic 
Injunctions, possess adequate knowledge of Islamic teachings and practice 
obligatory duties prescribed by Islam, as well as abstain from major sins, 
and has not, after the establishment of Pakistan, worked against the 
integrity of the country or opposed the ideology of Pakistan.
63
 The 
President (Head of State) must be a citizen of Pakistan, a Muslim, 45 years 
 
 
 56. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (hereinafter International 
IDEA), International Electoral Standards: Guidelines for reviewing the legal framework of elections, 
IDEA.INT 101, http://www.idea.int/publications/ies/upload/electoral_guidelines.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 
2015) [hereinafter International Electoral Standards]. 
 57. International IDEA, About Us, IDEA.INT, http://www.idea.int/about/index.cfm (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2015).  
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. PAK. CONST. June 8, 1962, art. 62(1)(a)-(g), http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/ 
constitution/part3.ch2.html. 
 63. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol16/iss1/8
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of age or above, and qualified to be elected as member of the National 
Assembly.
64
  
General elections are administered by the constitutionally established 
Election Commission of Pakistan (hereinafter ECP).
65
 A permanent ECP 
duty is “to organize and conduct the election and to make such 
arrangements as are necessary to ensure that the election is conducted 
honestly, justly, fairly, and in accordance with law, and that corrupt 
practices are guarded against.”66 Courts are barred from questioning the 
legality of any action taken in good faith by the ECP and no suit, 
prosecution, or other legal proceeding can be instituted against it for 
anything done in good faith.
67
  
II. RETURN OF THE EXILED  
During the twentieth century, three controversial and highly politicized 
leaders were exiled. These deposed leaders did not return to their native 
country post-exile and represent a stark contrast to current trends of exiled 
leaders returning to their national States.  
A. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi  
Over the course of his 26-year reign, the Shah of Iran alienated most of 
his subjects including wealthy landowners, peasants, middle-class 
merchants, and the Shiite clergy. He and his supporters garnered much 
resentment because of their pro-Western policies. Iran’s subsequent 
political reforms allowed dissenters to overthrow the government and erect 
a new regime led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
68
 
The Shah spent the rest of his life in exile. Most countries were 
reluctant to provide him with a safe haven, as they feared they might 
alienate the new Iranian regime by doing so.
69
 After a few months in 
Egypt, the Shah moved to Morocco where he stayed until King Hassan II 
decided he was a political liability. Next, he requested asylum in the 
United States but was denied citing concerns for the safety of Americans 
 
 
 64. Id. art. 41.  
 65. Id. art. 218–219.  
 66. The Election Commission Order, 2002, C.E.’s Order No. 1 of 2002 (PAK), ECP.GOV.PK 
5,32, http://ecp.gov.pk/frmGenericPage.aspx?PageID=3025. 
 67. Id. at 9(D). 
 68. Erik Sass, Get Out! How 8 Dictators Spent Their Exile Years, MENTAL FLOSS (Apr. 22, 
2011), http://mentalfloss.com/article/27570/get-out-how-8-dictators-spent-their-exile-years. 
 69. Id. 
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still in Iran. The Shah then moved to the Bahamas until the U.K. forced 
him to relocate to Mexico.
70
 
In October 1979, he was allowed into the U.S. for a cancer treatment, 
which was unsuccessful. The Shah’s admission to the United States 
sparked an outrage in Iran. Radical students retaliated by taking over the 
U.S. Embassy in Tehran and holding embassy workers hostage for 444 
days.
71
 In order to take political pressure off the U.S., the Shah traveled to 
Panama. The Panamanian government, however, was hesitant and even 
considered extraditing him to face charges of murder and torture. To avoid 
extradition to Iran, the Shah returned to Egypt where he died in Cairo on 
July 28, 1980.
72
 
B. Ferdinand Marcos 
During Ferdinand Marcos’s tenure as President and Prime Minister of 
the Philippines from 1965 to 1986, he stole an estimated $5 billion-$10 
billion from the country. Other notable offenses under his rule include an 
estimated 3,257 murders, 35,000 torture victims, and 70,000 political 
prisoners.
73
 Marcos was fully supported by the United States until 1983 
when the opposition leader, Benigno Aquino Jr., was assassinated and 
Marcos was exiled.
74
 He first headed to Guam and then Hawaii with the 
help of the U.S. military.
75
 Marcos spent the next couple of years in 
comfortable exile while receiving medical care for multiple ailments. He 
died on September 28, 1989 at the age of 72.
76
 
While Marcos was exiled, investigators in the Philippines uncovered 
evidence of excessive corruption. In Republic of Philippines v. Marcos,
77
 
he was charged under RICO in U.S. federal courts. The Ninth Circuit held 
that the suit was not barred under the act of state or political question 
doctrines.
78
 The Second Circuit held that proceeds of theft located within a 
court’s jurisdiction could be frozen until the Philippines court had a 
chance to adjudicate the charges.
79
 In 2009, the government of the 
 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986); Republic of the Philippines 
v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1988). 
 78. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1361. 
 79. Id. at 354–55. 
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Philippines reported it had recovered about $2 billion looted by the 
Marcos.
80
  
C. Idi Amin 
Idi Amin, dictator of Uganda, launched his military career when 
Uganda was still a British colony.
81
 During the mid-1970s, his supporters 
began expropriating businesses owned by Uganda’s South Asian minority. 
Amin carried out massacres against rival African ethnic groups, resulting 
in the murder of approximately 300,000 people.
82
 His rule ended when he 
invaded Tanzania in 1978, provoking a counter-invasion and popular 
uprising. He was forced to flee in 1979. Amin first went to Libya which 
was under Colonel Qaddafi’s reign.83 Then in 1980, Amin settled in Saudi 
Arabia where the Saudi royal family supported his comfortable exile on 
the condition that he stay out of trouble. He died and was buried in Jeddah, 
Saudi Arabia in 2003.
84
  
D. Present-Day 
Many present-day exiled leaders, such as Musharraf and Bhutto, no 
longer choose to remain in their host country.
85
 Instead, they return to their 
national State with the intention of contesting in elections despite pending 
criminal charges; these serious charges are usually settled through closed 
door agreements.
86
 Due to the lack of electoral restrictions, these formerly 
exiled leaders have been allowed to threaten Pakistan’s developing 
 
 
 80. Id. 
 81. Sass, supra note 68. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See Hannah Dreier, Exiled Opposition Leader Arrested upon Return to Venezuela, AP.ORG 
(Oct. 15, 2015), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/63bdf53aab6243a08b1a736a1bdca03c/exiled-opposition-
leader-returns-venezuela-arrested. Venezuelan opposition leader, Manuel Rosales, lived in self-
imposed exile and returned to his country “after six years as a fugitive from corruption charges.” Id. 
He was accused of stealing public money. Id. Intelligence police met him at the airport where they 
arrested him. Id. See also Steve Wilson, Exiled Cambodian Opposition Leader Returns Home to 
Spearhead Election Campaign Against Hun Sen, TELEGRAPH (July 19, 2013), http://www.telegraph. 
co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/cambodia/10189661/Exiled-Cambodian-opposition-leader-returns-home-
to-spearhead-election-campaign-against-Hun-Sen.html (discussing opposition leader Sam Rainsy’s 
returned to Cambodia to campaign after being in exile since 2009 to avoid serving 11 years in prison 
on charges considered to be politically motivated.) 
 86. Isambard Wilkinson, Benazir Bhutto’s Triumphal Return to Pakistan, TELEGRAPH (Oct. 18, 
2007), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1566625/BenazirBhuttostriumphalreturntoPakistan. 
html (“Negotiations have led to an ‘understanding’ that allowed Ms Bhutto to return to Pakistan 
without having to face corruption charges.”). 
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democracy by contesting in national elections despite pending criminal 
charges. There needs to be a restriction on the candidacy of exiled leaders 
who are facing criminal charges that have yet to be adjudicated.  
Domestically, there has been some support for the restriction on 
political leaders running for office when they are facing criminal charges. 
In 2013, the Pakistani High Court disqualified Musharraf from contesting 
in the general elections when he returned from exile.
87
 Additionally, the 
ECP rejected his nomination papers in three districts citing his subversion 
of the Constitution when he took power in a coup in 1999.
88
 
In similar cases that year, two other high-ranking officials were 
disqualified from contesting in the elections. Raja Pervez Ashraf 
(departing Prime Minister for People’s Party of Pakistan) was disqualified 
facing substantial allegations of corruption and mismanagement.
89
 The 
ECP rejected his nomination papers and an appellate tribunal upheld the 
decision.
90
 Next, Yusuf Raza Giliani (former Prime Minister of Pakistan) 
was also disqualified from running for Parliament after his dismissal as 
Prime Minister by the Supreme Court.
91
 
In each of these scenarios domestic law—through the combination of 
rulings by the ECP and the judiciary—served to adequately protect the 
 
 
 87. Salman Masood, Musharraf Is Disqualified From Pakistani Elections, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 
2013), http://nyti.ms/170y15Z. 
 88. Id. See Pakistan’s Musharraf Charged in Treason Case, BBC NEWS (Mar. 31, 2014), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-26815518. “A court in Pakistan has charged former military 
ruler Pervez Musharraf with treason, the first army chief to face such a prosecution.” Id. He was 
“accused of unlawfully suspending the constitution and instituting a state of emergency rule in 2007.” 
Id. He was disqualified from standing in the country’s elections after returning from self-imposed exile 
in 2008 due to an array of charges related to his time in power (President from 2001–2008). Id.  
 89. Salman Masood, supra note 87.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. For a discussion on another exiled Pakistani official, see also Barry Bearak, Pakistan’s 
Deposed Leader is Given Pardon and Exiled, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2000/12/10/world/pakistan-s-deposed-leader-is-given-pardon-and-exiled.html. “Nawaz Sharif, the 
deposed prime minister of Pakistan, has been pardoned from his life sentence in prison and exiled with 
his family to Saudi Arabia . . . . [H]e will still have to forfeit more than $10 million in property and he 
remains disqualified from public office for 21 years.” Id. Sharif was elected twice as Pakistan’s prime 
minister before being ousted on October 12, 1999 in a military coup. Id. Saudi Arabia agreed to accept 
the Sharif family “on humanitarian grounds” as he suffers from a heart ailment and high blood 
pressure. Id. He was convicted on corruption charges, hijacking, and terrorism. Id. The Sharif family 
had supposedly been “making appeals for clemency to . . . Musharraf, the nation’s military ruler” at 
the time, who eventually pardoned the remaining jail sentence. Id. The deal was unexpected. But the 
“military government in Pakistan had been under international pressure to restore democracy.” Id. 
While local elections were scheduled to be held later that month, “Pakistan’s political structure [was] 
in chaos.” Id. After Sharif’s exile, it was noted that “longstanding leaders of three major political 
parties [would] be living outside the country including” Nawaz Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League, 
“Benazir Bhutto of the Pakistan’s People’s Party and Altaf Hussain of the Muttahida Qaumi 
Movement.” Id.  
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people of Pakistan’s interest in holding their leaders accountable. This has 
not always been the case as, just a few years prior to these decisions, 
Bhutto was allowed to return to contest in the 2008 general elections 
despite charges of corruption; these charges were subsequently struck 
down by Musharraf.
92
 This inconsistency needs to be addressed on a 
national and international level to ensure elections are administered fairly 
and political leaders are held accountable for wrongful actions. Without 
former executive officials being held answerable to the public, developing 
States will not be able to move closer to becoming stable democracies.  
III. APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW 
The problem of exiled leaders returning to contest national elections 
can be resolved by combining domestic and international law systems. To 
do this, it is important to evaluate the justifications for each; for neither 
system can exist without the other in today’s increasing globalized and 
inter-connected world. 
International law plays a role in resolving the problem, as it is an issue 
that crosses national borders. States—some of which are very powerful on 
the economic and political front—permit exiled leaders to reside in their 
territories. There are, of course, multiple complications with allowing only 
international law to dictate the terms and conditions of exile. For example, 
if exiled leaders decide to campaign from their host countries, is the host 
country obligated to prohibit them from doing so? Is a host country 
obligated to prevent exiled leaders from returning to their national State to 
contest in elections knowing they face serious criminal charges? It can be 
argued that placing this burden on a host country would actually hinder 
democratic processes from unfolding as it deprives the exiled leader’s 
national State of the opportunity to decide to prohibit the former leader 
from contesting. In other words, domestic safeguards may be in place to 
resolve this problem, such as what occurred through the denial of 
Musharraf’s nomination papers.93  
Domestic law plays a role in resolving the problem because, as 
discussed previously, international law leaves much of the implementation 
of election laws up to States.
94
 The determination of reasonable or 
 
 
 92. Wilkinson, supra note 86 (“Gen. Musharraf issued a presidential ordinance earlier this month 
striking down corruption charges against Ms Bhutto. However the supreme court has yet to rule on the 
legality of the ordinance.”).  
 93. Masood, supra note 87. 
 94. See supra Part I.B. 
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unreasonable restrictions on the right to be elected is a matter of domestic 
concern, albeit the restrictions are subject to objective review.
95
 Therefore, 
it can be argued that domestic law should provide the detailed, 
unambiguous laws governing rules of exile, right of return, and the right to 
stand in elections post-exile. On the other hand, many exiled leaders are 
dictators in name or in practice whose national State is either a weak 
democratic State or struggling to become a democratic State (i.e. transition 
in form of government). In these situations, domestic law would prove 
useless when the State is not equipped to challenge the exiled leader or 
prevent him/her from entering the election race. Additionally, judicial 
review may also be foreclosed in such situations.  
Simply relying on domestic law proves more difficult if the exiled 
leader is still very wealthy and resourceful with offshore assets or enters 
into some “off the record” agreement with the current government to re-
enter the political arena. Bhutto, for example, went into self-imposed exile 
during the 1990s amid large corruption charges.
96
 She returned in 2007 
against the backdrop of a possible power-sharing agreement with 
Musharraf to establish a moderate, pro-Western government.
97
 Musharraf 
issued a presidential ordinance striking down corruption charges against 
Bhutto. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has yet to rule on the legality of 
such an ordinance.
98
  
To account for these difficulties and prevent inconsistent rulings in 
developing democratic States, international law—in the form of an 
international declaration or General Assembly resolution—should create a 
general consensus prohibiting exiled leaders from contesting in national 
elections when criminal charges are pending against them. The exiled 
leader may only stand as a candidate in elections once the charges have 
been resolved through the State’s adjudicative process with a verdict in 
favor of the leader. If the exiled leader returns to contest in elections 
despite pending charges, remedial measures—including injunctions, house 
arrest, or judicial judgment—must be made available through the 
application of a State’s domestic election laws. The practical implications 
of this are enormous. First, it will advance democratic principles—notably 
accountability and transparency—in developing States. Second, it will 
 
 
 95. See supra Part I.B. 
 96. Wilkinson, supra note 86. 
 97. Id. (noting that “America and Britain have lobbied hard for Gen Musharraf to enter into a 
power-sharing arrangement with Ms Bhutto with the aim of establishing a moderate, pro-Western 
government.”). 
 98. Id.  
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incentivize current political leaders to comply with domestic and 
international laws instead of facing the possibility of exile and prohibition 
on a political life altogether. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Exile is usually offered as a practical, though unsatisfactory, solution to 
end mass atrocities or reach a temporary truce.
99
 On a domestic level, two 
principal justifications are given for allowing a deposed leader to seek a 
safe haven. First, dictators and military leaders usually demand impunity 
as a condition of relinquishing power. As a result, those eager to end 
conflict or fearful of repercussions from attempts to hold the deposed 
leader accountable may not pursue criminal trials or other proceedings. 
Second, a country’s new regime, even if it is committed to prosecuting the 
deposed leader, is often faced with considerable number of logistical 
obstacles in implementing this prosecution.
100
 Additionally international 
negotiators, eager to reach a settlement to end a bloody conflict or protect 
their own States’ interests, often discourage prosecution.101  
Exile goes hand in hand with amnesty.
102
 The difference between 
amnesty and exile is that the former immunizes the perpetrator from 
domestic prosecution, while the latter puts the perpetrator out of the 
 
 
 99. Sadat, supra note 33, at 987.  
 100. Id. at 988. For example, during the Rwandan genocide of 1994, Rwanda’s justice system was 
completely eviscerated. Id.  
 101. Id. at 990. See also Michael P. Scharf, From the eXile Files: An Essay on Trading Justice for 
Peace, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 339, 342–43 (2006) (“[D]uring the past thirty years, Angola, 
Argentina, Brazil, Cambodia, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Nicaragua, 
Peru, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Togo, and Uruguay have each, as part of a peace arrangement, 
granted amnesty to members of the former regime that committed international crimes within their 
respective borders.”). The United Nations actually “pushed for, helped negotiate, or endorsed the 
granting of amnesty as a means of restoring peace and democratic government” in five countries: 
Cambodia, El Salvador, Haiti, Sierra Leone, and South Africa. Id. at 343 (quoting Michael P. Scharf, 
The Letter of the Law: The Scope of the International Legal Obligation to Prosecute Human Rights 
Crimes, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 41, 41 (1996)).  
 102. See Gwen K. Young, Comment, Amnesty and Accountability, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 427, 
430 (2002). Amnesty is when a state forgets crimes committed by perpetrators, such as torture, extra-
judicial killings, and other crimes against humanity. Id. International convention obligations have 
significantly narrowed the scope of acceptable forms of amnesty. Id. at 456. For example, amnesty is 
not valid if it prevents “investigation, prosecution, or redress for certain serious international crimes 
such as torture and disappearances. Id. at 456–57. The UNCHR considers self-and-blanket amnesties 
invalid. Therefore, the trend has been to allow discrete amnesties which allow individual 
accountability. Id. at 457. See also Sadat, supra note 33, at 959 (“While exile might still be an option 
for individuals accused of general venality—tax fraud, corruption, or embezzlement—the notion of 
allowing the perpetrators of human rights atrocities to go unpunished appears to have become 
normatively unacceptable.”). 
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jurisdictional reach of domestic prosecution.
103
 “[R]ecent travails suggest 
that political amnesties, particularly when imposed from above, rather than 
democratically adopted from within, may cause a country already 
struggling with democracy and human rights to slip further into chaos, 
rather than enter a period of stability and tranquility.”104 Furthermore, 
history has shown that exiled leaders are prone to recidivism, often 
resorting to corruption and violence, and disrupting the peace process in 
its entirety.
105
 In developing countries where democratic institutions are 
weak, exiled leaders charged with serious offenses standing for election 
hinder the implementation of international principles of accountability and 
transparency. This can be especially harmful in these countries as “[w]hat 
a new or reinstated democracy needs most is legitimacy, which requires a 
fair, credible, and transparent account of what took place and who was 
responsible.”106 A common criticism to prohibiting the return of exiled 
leaders is that it may hinder political processes that strengthen 
democracy.
107
 This criticism is well-founded only if the returning exiled 
leaders are not charged with criminal offenses that need to be resolved 
through an adjudicative process.  
There are a myriad of reasons why exiled leaders with criminal charges 
should be barred from contesting in elections. There are of course practical 
implications, as in one cannot represent a nation or vote in parliament if 
one is declared guilty and locked in prison.
108
 On a more philosophical 
level, such restrictions relate to society’s understanding of citizenship, 
 
 
 103. Scharf, supra note 101, at 343 (noting that both amnesty and exile are often used to induce 
regime change). 
 104. Sadat, supra note 33, at 991. Amnesty granted in the case of Haiti was not of any real 
assistance to bring about an end to human rights atrocities committed during the conflict in the 1990s. 
Id. Jean-Bertrand Aristide who was elected President with majority vote was overthrown by a military 
coup in 1991. Id. The Governors Island Agreement of 1993 promised the return of constitutional rule 
in exchange for amnesty for coup leaders. But this amnesty appears to have destabilized the country 
according to some experts. Id. at 992–93. Principle 7(1) of the Princeton Principles on Universal 
Jurisdiction provides that “[a]mnesties are generally inconsistent with the obligation of states to 
provide accountability for serious crimes under international law,” which suggests that domestic 
amnesties for jus cogens crimes is undesirable, though not prohibited per se. Id. at 1018.  
 105. Scharf, supra note 101, at 348. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Karachi: Return of Exiled Leaders Urged, DAWN.COM (Jan. 15, 2007), http://www.dawn. 
com/news/227960/karachi-return-of-exiled-leaders-urged (“Speakers at a function [in Pakistan] 
. . . demanded that all political leaders [living abroad] in exile be allowed to return” to Pakistan in 
order to contest in elections arguing that if said popular leaders were denied an “active part in 
politics . . . the credibility of the system would always remain doubtful.”). 
 108. Ian Holland, Crime and Candidacy, APH.GOV.AU (Mar. 24, 2003), http://www.aph.gov.au/ 
About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/CIB/cib0
203/03CIB22. 
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specifically what it means to be a “good” citizen.109 The relationship 
between citizenship and elected leadership dates back to the time of 
Aristotle.
110
 Criminal acts are incompatible with citizenry because if one is 
incapable of being a citizen, one should not hold political office.
111
 For 
example, treason is a common disqualification from holding political 
office because the act itself is viewed as being inconsistent with the safety 
or stability of the State.
112
 Therefore, legal restrictions barring exiled 
leaders with criminal charges from contesting in elections are preferable to 
relying on the electorate to assess the worthiness of the individual. 
When evaluating adequate legal protections, the trickier question is 
how to distinguish between those who are charged with breaking a law 
and those who advocate contempt for the law
113
 as contempt for the law 
may signify that a person is not concerned with the stability of the legal 
system of its society. In judicial terms, the distinction is one of due process 
and separation between opinion and action. In political philosophy the 
distinction becomes blurred.
114
 It is possible, however, to differentiate 
types of law breaking as there are actions undertaken with respect for 
constitutional order and those which hold the State’s constitution in 
contempt. There can also be a distinction drawn between lawbreakers 
seeking their own self-interest and those who advocate for the interests of 
others. Additionally, there are lawbreakers who seek to evade punishment 
(i.e., denying constitutional order) and those who are not (i.e., belief in a 
broader rule of law in a sense).
115
  
 
 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. Aristotle “defined citizenship in terms of participation, including the holding of public 
office.” Id. The premise that criminal conducts is inconsistent with citizenship was articulated by 
Aristotle in The Politics in which he argued that “[t]he task of all the citizens, however different they 
may be, is the stability of the association, that is, the constitution. Therefore the virtue of the citizen 
must be in relation to the constitution.” Id. 
 111. Id. See also Dr. Reynaldo T. Casas, Disqualify Political Candidates with Criminal Records, 
BUSINESS.INQUIRER.NET (Dec. 7, 2015), http://business.inquirer.net/203672/disqualify-political-
candidates-with-criminal-records. Dr. Casas argues placing a ban on politicians with criminal records 
from contesting in elections as they have forfeited their right to lead the Philippines. He notes that 
national governments ultimately will have to “pass a law to disqualify candidates with proven criminal 
records . . . .” Id.  
 112. Ian Holland, Crime and Candidacy, APH.GOV.AU (Mar. 24, 2003), http://www.aph.gov. 
au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/CIB/ 
cib0203/03CIB22. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
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In addition, a key question in asking who can be a political 
representative is who the community is willing to accept.
116
 People seem 
to make distinctions between types of law breaking,
117
 and in today’s 
world, it is highly unlikely that the electorate would not know of an exiled 
leader’s criminal record. In order for the public to properly evaluate the 
actions of the law breaker, they must have access to different means of 
relaying information (technological or otherwise). Further, given likely 
community consensus, more serious criminal acts including murder, 
torture, rape, corruption, treason, and international offenses including 
crimes against humanity and genocide should automatically prohibit an 
exiled leader facing these charges from contesting in national elections 
given the gravity and nature of the crimes.  
A. The Role of Domestic and International Law 
Strengthening domestic laws is vital to prohibiting exiled leaders with 
pending criminal charges from contesting in national elections. Without 
legislation on the domestic level, exiled leaders will continue to take 
advantage of systems that do not bar their candidacy. Laws governing 
election of exiled leaders allow domestic courts to step in and institute 
judicial proceedings to uphold such legislation.  
Pakistan’s electoral standards represent a move in the right direction. 
The constitutional provisions concerning eligibility of the Prime Minister 
and President include requirements such as good conduct of character and 
must not work against the integrity or oppose the ideology of Pakistan.
118
 
Though neither of these provisions explicitly relate to the possibility of a 
candidate facing criminal charges, it can be read implicitly.  
Another domestic safeguard in Pakistan is the duty discharged to the 
ECP. The Election Commission must “ensure that the election is 
conducted honestly, justly, fairly, and in accordance with law, and that 
corrupt practices are guarded against.”119 A former leader in exile charged 
 
 
 116. Id. (citing the example of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the current President of Turkey, who was 
legally prevented from taking office even though he had support from the community.). 
 117. Id. This proved true in the re-election attempt in 1993 of Keith Wright (sitting federal MP) 
who was charged with indecent dealing. Id. Although he continued to “proclaim his innocence, he 
received only 5.9 percent of the vote. . . .” Id. In Australia, some restrictions on political candidacy are 
written in constitutions while others are written in legislation such as electoral laws. Id. Nevertheless, 
“[l]aws restricting the ability of criminals to engage in politics exist in every Australian jurisdiction.” 
Id. These laws vary. For example, most jurisdictions ban a candidate for life if convicted of treason. Id. 
There are differences in the length of ban concerning felonies, however. Id.  
 118. See discussion supra Part I.C.  
 119. See The Election Commission Order, supra note 66. 
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with criminal offenses being prevented from standing in elections falls 
within this provision. Allowing such a person to participate in the election 
would be a corrupt action since there has not been a formal judicial 
proceeding on the innocence or guilt of the leader. This corrupt action 
would run afoul of the ECP’s duty to conduct elections in an honest and 
just fashion. The ECP’s fulfillment of its duty was seen in Musharraf’s 
case when it rejected his nomination papers for violating the laws of the 
State by subverting the Constitution and taking power in a coup.
120
 The 
more difficult situation for the ECP and Pakistan occurs when charges are 
dropped, as in Bhutto’s case,121 because government officials within the 
State reach an agreement favorable to both parties’ political ambitions. 
This is where countries, like Pakistan, can look to international laws.  
Key principles of democratic elections are contained in a variety of 
international law sources, such as the ICCPR.
122
 Underlying these 
principles is the notion of “genuine” elections.123 As previously discussed, 
though States are given much discretion in implementing an electoral 
process, international law does indicate reasonable and unreasonable 
restrictions on the right to be elected;
124
 restrictions have to be justifiable 
on objective and reasonable criteria.
125
 One such reasonable restriction, 
according to international law, is criminal conviction.
126
 The issue for 
States is that criminal charges are not included under reasonable 
restrictions per se. 
In order to resolve this issue, one of two options may be considered. A 
State, such as Pakistan, may stipulate its own provision within its electoral 
standards establishing that exiled leaders with pending criminal charges 
are barred from contesting in national elections until such charges are 
adjudicated. If it did so, Pakistan would have the burden of proving the 
restriction imposed on these ICCPR Article 25 rights is reasonable.
127
 The 
second option would be an international declaration (akin to the UDHR) or 
a United Nations General Assembly resolution recognizing this provision 
as a reasonable restriction on the right to be elected. While international 
declarations and General Assembly resolutions are not given as much 
weight as an international convention, they remain an important 
 
 
 120. Masood, supra note 3. 
 121. Wilkinson, supra note 86. 
 122. Democracy Reporting International, supra note 37, at 6. 
 123. Id. 
 124. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 125. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 126. See discussion supra Part I.B. 
 127. Democracy Reporting International, supra note 37, at 30. 
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persuasive source in international law.
128
 The reason for a declaration or 
resolution as opposed to an international convention is one of practicality. 
It would be an incredibly arduous task to obtain ratifications and 
accessions to such a convention because, as discussed before, international 
obligations on electoral standards are generally not self-executing.
129
 They 
need to be implemented through a State’s domestic law130 because each 
State ultimately is a sovereign. The declaration or resolution will permit 
States to point to a source of general international consensus should it 
need to justify the reasonableness of a domestically implemented 
restriction. This combination of domestic and international law provides a 
starting point for States to address the trend of exiled leaders with criminal 
charges contesting in elections before the charges are properly adjudicated.  
B. The Role of Courts 
When an exiled leader facing criminal charges returns to the State, the 
judiciary then must play an important role in adjudicating the case. An 
initial question in this matter is what court has jurisdiction to hear the case. 
Though the default answer is usually the State’s domestic courts, the 
nature of the criminal offense is important to discern prior to choosing a 
legal forum. International crimes are prosecuted differently from domestic 
crimes stemming from municipal laws. At the international level there are 
only a few courts with jurisdiction to hear cases involving individual 
accountability. The ICC establishes individual criminal liability for serious 
international crimes.
131
 However, the ICC takes cases only when a State is 
unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute.
132
 A case is inadmissible if 
 
 
 128. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1 (“The Court, whose function is to 
decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:  
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly 
recognized by the contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of 
rules of law.”)  
 129. See discussion supra Part I.B.  
 130. Goodwin-Gill, supra note 37, at 161. 
 131. Young, supra note 102, at 458. The ultimate objective of the ICC is to end impunity for 
perpetrators. Id. at 459.  
 132. Id. at 458–59 (noting that articles 17, 20, and 53 of the Rome Statute of the ICC allow the 
court to take cases when a state is unwilling or unable to investigate or prosecute.) Factors to 
determine unwillingness include: (1) a state’s decision to shield the perpetrator from criminal 
responsibility, (2) unjustified delay in prosecution or investigation, or (3) national proceedings which 
do not manifest an intent to bring the perpetrator to justice. The inability to prosecute also includes the 
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the State with jurisdiction over the individual is investigating or 
prosecuting the case or if the State has investigated or tried the individual 
with the intent to bring the person to justice.
133
 Furthermore, the ICC does 
not replace or add to national jurisdiction, rather it complements national 
jurisdiction.
134
 For the ICC to hear a case involving an exiled leader 
standing for election, the international community would have to 
recognize the very act of contesting as a serious offense. This seems 
unlikely considering there are virtually no international conventions 
specifically prohibiting exiled leaders with criminal charges from 
contesting nor enough ratifications for the conventions that are in place.
135
  
The International Court of Justice is another legal forum for States that 
are members of the United Nations.
136
 Each member of the United Nations 
“undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of 
Justice in any case to which it is a party.”137 The jurisdiction of the Court 
includes legal disputes concerning the interpretation of a treaty or any 
question of international law as the parties (i.e., States) refer to the 
Court.
138
 The ICCPR is the only convention close enough to outlining 
electoral rights with a large number of State ratifications.
139
 The 
International Court of Justice may potentially hear a case concerning the 
interpretation of the convention as it relates to Article 25 rights and 
determining reasonable restrictions on candidacy only if States agree to the 
Court’s jurisdiction.140 This scenario is unlikely, as it would essentially 
 
 
collapse of a state’s judicial system, its inability to apprehend the accused, and the inability to obtain 
the necessary evidence or testimony. Id. at 460. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 461. 
 135. But see id. at 471 (articulating that recognizing amnesty may be inconsistent with ICC aims 
because while the Preamble of the ICC states that the ultimate aim of the ICC is to ensure individual 
accountability for human rights violators, and by not addressing amnesty the Rome Statute does not 
provide the ICC with any guidelines to ensure that recognition of amnesty is in compliance with 
individual accountability). The same can be argued to an extent with respect to exile. Like amnesty, 
exile is also a reality in the international community.  
 136. U.N. Charter art. 93, ¶ 1 (“All Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice . . . .”). 
 137. Id. art. 94, ¶ 1.  
 138. Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note, 128, art. 36, ¶ 1-2 (“1. The 
jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially 
provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force. 2. The states 
parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and 
without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction 
of the Court in all legal disputes concerning: a. the interpretation of a treaty; b. any question of 
international law . . . .”). 
 139. See supra note 37, at 6. There are 168 States party to the ICCPR. Id.  
 140. See discussion supra Part I.B.  
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require States to be in dispute about each other’s domestic electoral 
standards and candidate eligibility.  
Given these restrictions, the only realistic forum to bring judicial 
proceedings against an exiled leader with criminal charges would be a 
State’s domestic courts. From a policy perspective, the exiled leader is 
being held accountable by the courts of its State which exemplifies 
transparency and fairness within the legal system. It also symbolizes an 
innately democratic judicial action.  
C. The Role of Host States 
Lastly, the role of States granting a safe haven to exiled leaders can be 
analyzed by comparing exile to amnesty. Because there is such little 
discussion at the international level about exile, amnesty serves as an 
appropriate analogy. Domestic amnesty is lawful in the State where it is 
granted.
141
 With exile the question remains of what actions, if any, is a 
host State to prohibit exiled leaders with criminal charges from returning 
to their State for national elections. The concept of sovereignty
142
 dictates 
that the national State of the exiled leader has the authority to take action 
as it sees fit. Therefore, if an exiled leader has criminal allegations, it is for 
the national State to enforce its election laws and bar the individual from 
 
 
 141. See Sadat, supra note 33, at 1023. “However, the situation before a court in a third state is 
quite different.” Id. The concept of universal jurisdiction comes into the picture, which is exercised by 
States or the international community. In addition, States exercising universal jurisdiction over 
perpetrators do so pursuant to their own “internal legislation” created to that effect. Id. If a forum State 
is to exercise universal jurisdiction in a case where domestic amnesty is granted to a defendant, the 
first question to answer is what law applies. Because:  
[p]ublic international law has not yet developed a system of conflicts of laws to address this 
question, it is largely operating under the Lotus paradigm: every state being an independent 
sovereign, every state may apply its law to a problem unless there is some rule prohibiting it 
from doing so.  
Id. 
[A] national court exercising universal jurisdiction has a dual role: to apply and interpret 
national law, and to effectively sit as a court of the international community, applying 
international legal norms. Thus in considering what effect a national amnesty should have 
before a foreign court, it is appropriate to consider whether the applicable law should be the 
law of the forum state, the law of the state granting the defendant immunity, the law of the 
state of the defendant’s nationality, the law of the state upon whose territory the crimes were 
committing (the territorial state), or international law to resolve this question. 
Id. at 1024. 
 142. See WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW (ed. 2) (2008) (defining sovereignty as the 
“supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which an independent state is governed and from 
which all specific powers are derived . . . .”). It is the independence of a state, and its right and power 
to regulate its internal affairs without foreign interference. It includes powers such as making, 
executing, and applying laws, imposing and collecting taxes, making war and peace, forming treaties, 
and engaging in trade with foreign nations. Id. 
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contesting (assuming it has such domestic laws in place). Additionally, if 
an exiled leader is facing criminal charges, it is for the national State to 
institute judicial proceedings in its domestic courts. There may, however, 
be legitimate concerns regarding a national State’s judiciary process. The 
primary concern is whether or not the judicial system is competent and 
transparent enough to carry forth such proceedings. If the legal system of a 
State is fragile to begin with, it is difficult to implement fair proceedings 
which do not fall victim to bribery, threats, or other forms of coercion at 
the hands of the exiled leader.  
The State providing a safe haven may condition the exile on the 
leader’s promise to refrain from contesting in elections from either the 
host country or by returning to his or her country of origin. As in previous 
cases, some States have placed varying conditions on exiled leaders 
residing within their territory (as Saudi Arabia did with Idi Amin).
143
 
Further, the State could apply its own domestic election laws and bar the 
exiled leader, or deny exile entirely.
144
 In exercising universal jurisdiction, 
the domestic court of the State granting exile would have a dual role. First, 
it would apply and interpret national law. Second, it would act as an 
international court and apply international legal norms. In order to 
evaluate the effects of allowing such exercise of jurisdiction, it is 
important to consider whether the applicable law should be the law of the 
national State, the law of the State granting the leader exile, the law of the 
State where the crimes were committed, or international law.
145
 These 
options remain to be assessed with respect to exile.  
 
 
 143. Sass, supra note 68.  
 144. REP. AND ANALYSIS OF IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW, 82 No. 26 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 1061 (July 1, 2005) (Westlaw). In 2005 the Attorney General denied asylum to a leader in 
exile of the Islamic Salvation Front of Algeria who was associated with armed groups who committed 
acts of persecution and terrorism in Algeria. Id. The reasoning given by the Department of Justice was 
that the U.S. has significant interests in combating violent acts of persecution and terrorism and it is 
therefore inconsistent to provide a safe haven to individuals connected to such acts of violence. Id.  
 145. See Sadat, supra note 33, at 1024. In deciphering: 
 the legal status of an individual accused of a jus cogens crime, who has sought and been 
given refuge in a third state . . . the short answer appears to be that the individual may benefit 
from the grant of asylum within the state of refuge under the constitutional system in place 
there, but presumably could not travel with his immune status, for it would cease to have any 
effect outside the territory of the state of refuge (Returning to the Idi Amin example . . . it will 
be recalled that the Ugandan government stated that he would be arrested if he returned from 
his exile in Saudi Arabia.). Given that criminal laws are generally laws of territorial 
application, surely it cannot be that granting immunity to Charles Taylor in Nigeria, for 
example, or to Idi Amin in Saudi Arabia, affects the prescriptive jurisdiction of the territorial 
state. Thus, the effect of a transnational amnesty (exile) in the territorial state (or presumably 
any third state as well), would appear to be null. Similarly, as is the case with domestic 
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CONCLUSION 
This trend of exiled leaders returning to their State to contest in 
national elections despite pending criminal charges is troubling. It is 
undermining the progress of States trying to implement democratic 
institutions and reforms. It is hindering the development of an electoral 
system that is fair, free, and transparent. Additionally, this is preventing 
leaders from being held accountable for serious offenses by allowing them 
to continue to participate in the electoral process without a formal 
adjudication of their past crimes. While it is not clear how long this trend 
will persist, it is clear that some steps need to be taken to address the 
problem before it becomes all too common for exiled leaders to escape 
accountability. Musharraf and Bhutto’s cases serve as examples of a State 
struggling to advance democratic principles, of which free and fair 
elections are crucial.  
A combination of domestic and international law must govern the 
issue. First, a general consensus should exist in the form of an 
international declaration or General Assembly resolution to prohibit exiled 
leaders from contesting in national elections amid pending criminal 
charges. This would allow a State to implement this restriction 
domestically and use the consensus reached by the international 
community to bolster the reasonableness of the restriction.  
An exiled leader must only be allowed to stand as a candidate in 
elections once all charges have been resolved through the national State’s 
adjudicative process. This proposition will advance democratic principles, 
such as accountability and transparency in developing States. It will also 
incentivize current political leaders in developing States to comply with 
domestic and international laws. 
            Fizza Batool

  
 
 
amnesties before international courts, presumably any grant of exile has no legal effect before 
an international court (as the SCSL held by implication in the Charles Taylor case). 
Id. at 1031. 
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